

EXCLUSIVE REPORT - ADV. FOR WEDNESDAY MAY 23

(EDITOR'S NOTE: SAM ADAMS, 39, A DESCENDANT OF PRESIDENT ADAMS, MAY BE THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S MOST OUTSPOKEN EX-EXPERT. HE HAS RESIGNED, CHARGING THE CIA HAS MISHANDLED INDOCHINA INTELLIGENCE. IN THIS FIRST OF TWO "EXCLUSIVE REPORTS" BASED ON EXTENSIVE INTERVIEWS WITH ADAMS, CORRESPONDENT PATRICK J. SLOYAN SETS FORTH THE ANALYST'S DETAILED ACCOUNT OF CIA SURPRISE OVER THE COMMUNISTS' 1968 TET OFFENSIVE.)

BY PATRICK J. SLOYAN

(NAME OF PAPER) WASHINGTON BUREAU

WASHINGTON, MAY 23--A VETERAN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXPERT ON INDOCHINA, WHO QUIT BECAUSE OF WHAT HE CALLS THE GOVERNMENT'S PURSUIT OF "SELF DELUSION," SAYS IT IS "JUST A MATTER OF TIME" BEFORE THE FALL OF U.S.-BACKED GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA.

"THE BASIC PROBLEM TODAY FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS THAT IT IS RIDDLED WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE AGENTS," SAID SAMUEL A. ADAMS. "THERE ARE ABOUT 30,000 COMMUNIST AGENTS IN THE THIEU GOVERNMENT, FROM TOP POSTS DOWN TO PROVINCE AND HAMLET JOBS."

AS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF LON NOL IN PHNOM PENH, ADAMS SAYS U.S.-SUPPORTED FORCES ARE FACING DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF INSURGENT FORCES AS ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED. "IT COULD GO ANYTIME," HE SAID.

ADAMS' STATEMENTS ARE BASED ON A TEN-YEAR CAREER AT THE CIA, MOST OF IT AS THE LEADING EXPERT ON THE VIET CONG, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS WHO SUPPORT AND ARE SUPPLIED BY NORTH VIETNAM. BECAUSE OF HIS VIETNAM BACKGROUND, HE WAS CALLED AS A DEFENSE WITNESS IN THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE AGAINST DANIEL ELLSBERG, WHICH ENDED RECENTLY IN A MISTRIAL AND DISMISSAL OF CHARGES.

ADAMS' RESIGNATION BECOMES EFFECTIVE JUNE 1 AND HAS ALREADY CAUSED RIPPLES OF CONTROVERSY AT CIA HEADQUARTERS AND ON CAPITOL HILL.

"MY MAIN REASON (FOR LEAVING) IS THAT U.S. INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN NEITHER HONEST ENOUGH NOR THOROUGH ENOUGH IN CONDUCTING RESEARCH ON THE WAR IN INDOCHINA," ADAMS SAID.

"THE FAILURES IN RESEARCH HAVE LED TO REPEATED MISJUDGMENTS OF THE NATURE AND STRENGTH OF OUR ADVERSARIES THERE."

IN A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS, ADAMS, 39, SAID HE HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO IMPROVE MATTERS THROUGH CHANNELS. "MY CRITICISMS WERE MET WITH EVASION, DELAY AND SOMETIMES THREAT," HE SAID.

ADAMS' BATTLES WITHIN THE AGENCY, INCLUDING FACE-TO-FACE STRUGGLES WITH FORMER DIRECTOR RICHARD HELMS, GO TO THE HEART OF CRUCIAL DECISIONS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

THROUGH ELABORATE AND EXPENSIVE COLLECTION SYSTEMS, INCLUDING SPY SATELLITES, ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING AND SECRET AGENTS, THE CIA AMASSES SECRET INFORMATION ABOUT NATIONS, THEIR FORCES AND THEIR LEADERS.

THE COVERT OR CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS OF THE CIA IN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IS THE MOST CELEBRATED AND OFTEN THE SOURCE OF

CONTROVERSY. SUCH AS AGENCY LINKS WITH THE MARIANNAH CHAMBER

THIS SHEET THREE SLOAN-CIA-EXCLUSIVE REPORT-RLS WED MAY 23  
X X X SCANDAL.

THIS INFORMATION IS FUNNELED INTO CIA HEADQUARTERS AT LANGLEY, VA. THERE IT IS ANALYZED BY MEN SUCH AS ADAMS, WITH IMPORTANT INFORMATION GOING TO THE PRESIDENT IN THE BOUND, BLUE BOOK TITLED, "NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES."

IT WAS ONE OF THESE TOP SECRET REPORTS, PRESENTED TO PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON IN 1967, THAT ADAMS HAS SINCE DONDENMED AS A "MONUMENT OF DECEIT."

BESIDES MISLEADING JOHNSON, ADAMS CONTENDS THE CIA HAS USED DOCTORED REPORTS TO FIT THE DEMANDS OF SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS WHO WANTED TO APPEAR TO BE WINNING THE WAR IN INDOCHINA.

"IT IS CONTINUING TODAY IN CAMBODIA," ADAMS SAID. "THEY ARE GIVING ESTIMATES TO PRESIDENT NIXON BASED ON AN ACCOUNTING SYSTEM THAT IS CLOSE TO OUTRIGHT FAKING."

IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISPUTE ADAMS' VIEWS. THE CIA REFUSES TO DISCUSS ITS INNER WORKING WITH NEWSMEN. BUT SOME CIA OFFICIALS SAY PRIVATELY THAT ADAMS HAS A REPUTATION AS A "BOAT ROCKER."

"THE TROUBLE WITH SAM IS HE WAS RIGHT MOST OF THE TIME," SAID ONE OFFICIAL. "AND THAT CAUSED A LOT OF TROUBLE FOR SOME IMPORTANT PEOPLE."

ADAMS WAS BORN IN REDDING, CONN., A DESCENDANT OF PRESIDENT CUMMINGS-ADAMS. HE WAS GRADUATED FROM HARVARD, SERVED AS A NAVAL OFFICER AND JOINED THE CIA IN 1963. AFTER A STINT IN THE BELGIAN CONGO, HE WAS ASSIGNED IN 1965 TO STUDY VIET CONG MORALE.

(MORE)

TX19 SHEET FOUR SLOYAN-CIA-EXCLUSIVE REPORT-RLS WED MAY 23 X X X  
MORALE.

"I BECAME THE EXPERT ON THE VIET CONG BECAUSE I WAS THE ONLY GUY TO DO ANY RESEARCH ON THEM," ADAMS SAID. "WE HAD SOME GENERAL INFORMATION, BUT NO REAL DETAILED STUFF."

ADAMS MADE A SERIES OF TRIPS TO VIETNAM TO LEARN ABOUT THE ENEMY. HE CONDUCTED ENDLESS INTERVIEWS WITH ENEMY PRISONERS AND DEFECTORS. HE FILLED FOUR SAFES WITH CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. "THE DOCUMENTS ARE VALUABLE IF YOU USE THEM PROPERLY, JUDGING THEM AS A WHOLE RATHER THAN TO BACK UP A SPECIFIC POINT," HE SAID.

HE AUTHORED, "GUIDE TO A VIET CONG PROVINCE," STILL THE ONLY GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK ON THE GUERRILLA FORCES. HE WAS ASSIGNED TO LECTURE ON THE VIET CONG TO ALL CIA AGENTS DESTINED FOR VIETNAM. HE WAS PROMOTED TO THE STAFF OF HELMS, THE THEN CIA CHIEF.

THIS DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF THE VIET CONG ORGANIZATION AND ORDER OF BATTLE LED ADAMS TO AN ASTOUNDING CONCLUSION IN 1967. UPON UNDERSTANDING THE EXTENSIVENESS OF VIET CONG OPERATIONS AND ADMINISTRATION, IT BECAME CLEAR TO ADAMS THAT AMERICAN FORCES WERE FACING DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF ENEMY THEN ESTIMATED.

MOST INTELLIGENCE IS BASED ON GUESSWORK, AND AT THAT POINT, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAD GUESSED THE VIET CONG INVOLVED 300,000 MEN, DIVIDED INTO MAIN AND LOCAL FORCES PLUS CIVILIAN GUERRILLA AND SERVICE PERSONNEL.

"IT WAS A CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATE BASED ON WHAT WAS CALLED 'ACTUAL' EVIDENCE," ADAMS SAID. FOR EXAMPLE, TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF A BATTALION, AT LEAST THREE BATTALION IDENTIFICATION CARDS HAD TO BE RECOVERED FROM ENEMY BODIES.

(MORE)

TX20 SHEET FIVE SLOYAN-CIA-EXCLUSIVE REPORT--ADVM FOR WED MAY 23  
X X X BODIES.

"YOU CAN JUMP THESE ESTIMATES UP OR DOWN BY CHANGING THE REQUIREMENTS--TWO I.D. CARDS INSTEAD OF THREE," ADAMS SAID. "THE TROUBLE IS, THESE ESTIMATES WILL ALWAYS BE LOW BECAUSE YOU DO NOT ESTIMATE WHAT YOU CAN'T SEE."

ADAMS TOOK A DIFFERENT TACK. IF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED EVIDENCE OF A REGIMENT HERE, A BATTALION THERE, HE WOULD FILL OUT THE REST OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL CHART HE KNEW THE ENEMY USED.

"THESE WEREN'T JUST ISOLATED UNITS," HE SAID. "IT WAS VERY ELABORATE, EVERYTHING FROM SAPPERS, ENGINEERS, MEDICAL CORPS, ARTILLERY, POST OFFICE AND ADMINISTRATION--THEY WERE CAREFULLY ORGANIZED FOR YEARS."

BY FILLING OUT ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS, ADAMS GUESSED THE VIET CONG STRENGTH CLOSER TO 600,000 THAN 300,000. "IT WAS A SHOCK," HE SAID. "IN 1967, EVERYONE WANTED TO HEAR THAT THERE WERE LESS VIET CONG, NOT MORE."

IN 1967, THE ONLY GOOD NEWS PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAS GETTING WAS FROM GEN. EARLE WHEELER, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND GEN. WILLIAM WESTMORELAND, U.S. COMMAND IN VIETNAM.

ALTHOUGH ADAMS SAID HIS ESTIMATES WERE ACCEPTED BY THE MILITARY UNOFFICIALLY, FOR THE RECORD THEY KEPT INSISTING THAT THERE WERE ONLY 300,000 VIET CONG.

"INITIALLY, THE CIA ACCEPTED MY FIGURES BUT WE WERE ORDERED TO GET TOGETHER WITH MACV (MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN VIETNAM) AND COME UP WITH A COMMON ESTIMATE," ADAMS SAID.

"THE ARMY WAS UNDER ORDERS FROM WESTMORELAND TO KEEP THE FIGURES AT 300,000 EVEN THOUGH SOME OF THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE MEN TOLD ME LATER THAT I WAS RIGHT," ADAMS SAID.

(MORE)

TX21 SHEET SIX SLOYAN-CIA-EXCLUSIVE REPORT-RLS WED MAY 23 X X X  
ADAMS SAID.

AFTER A THREE-DAY SESSION IN AIR-CONDITIONED "PENTAGON EAST"  
ADAMS SAID HELMS ORDERED HIM TO GO ALONG WITH THE MILITARY VIEW.

"THEY WERE MORE CONCERNED WITH WHAT TO TELL THE PRESS," HE  
SAID. "IT FIT IN TO THE VIEW THAT WE WERE WINNING A WAR OF ATTRITION."  
BUT ADAMS DID NOT GIVE UP.

THE ISSUE STILL HAD TO BE REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT AND IT WAS  
UP TO THE BOARD OF ESTIMATES TO APPROVE THE OFFICIAL FINDINGS.

THE SIX MAN BOARD, MADE UP OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY VETERANS,  
COMPILE THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE IN A WINDOWLESS,  
CARPETED ROOM ON THE SEVENTH FLOOR OF THE CIA HEADQUARTERS.

"SAM, HAVE WE GONE BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF REASONABLE DISHONESTY?"  
A BOARD MEMBER ASKED ADAMS. ADAMS SAID YES AND SHOWED WHY HE  
BELIEVED THE MILITARY WAS MISLEADING.

"IT MAKES MY BLOOD BOIL TO SEE MACV COOKING THE BOOKS,"  
SAID ANOTHER BOARD MEMBER AFTER ADAMS' PRESENTATION.

"THERE'S NO VOTING BY THE BOARD," ADAMS EXPLAINED RECENTLY.  
"THEY READ THE DRAFT PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH, LISTENING TO  
OBJECTIONS AND ACCEPTING OR REJECTING. THEY ENDED UP FOLLOWING ORDERS."

OVERRULED BY THE BOARD, ADAMS CONTINUED TO FIGHT. FOR THE  
RECORD, HE ATTACKED THE DRAFT THAT EVENTUALLY WAS GIVEN TO  
PRESIDENT JOHNSON AS "UNWISE, LESS THAN CANDID, SNEAKY, AND ILL-  
FORMED." HE RECALLED THAT HE SAID JUST THAT IN A 1968 MEMO.

"MY MEMO ON THE DRAFT MADE IT CLEAR THAT I WAS ACCUSING THE  
AGENCY OF LYING, COWARDICE, BAD JUDGMENT AND INCOMPETENCE."

BUT ADAMS GOT NOWHERE. FINALLY, HE REQUESTED TO BE TAKEN OFF  
THE DIRECTOR'S STAFF IN A LETTER THAT ACCUSED THE AGENCY OF  
APPROVING A "MONUMENT OF DECEIT."

THE LETTER REQUESTING TRANSFER WAS DATED JAN. 30, 1967.

THE VERY NEXT DAY, THE VIET CONG AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE  
LAUNCHED THE TET HOLIDAY OFFENSIVE. "THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES  
WAS TOTALLY UNEXPECTED AND SO WAS THE NUMBER OF ATTACKERS," ADAMS SAID.

THE CUTTING EDGE OF THE ATTACKING UNITS WERE VIET CONG SAPPER  
GROUPS AND OTHER SERVICE UNITS--THE VERY SAME UNITS THE ARMY  
ONLY THREE MONTHS BEFORE TERMED NONEXISTENT.

BY APRIL, THE CIA CHANGED ITS MIND. IT THEN FORMALLY ESTIMATED  
THE VIET CONG AT MORE THAN 500,000.

"IT WAS TOO LATE BY THEN," ADAMS SAID.

(TOMORROW: ADAMS: CONGRESS MUST REFORM THE CIA)

TX22

SLOYAN-CIA-EXCLUSIVE REPORT--ADV. FOR THURSDAY, MAY 24

(PRECEDE) THIS IS THE SECOND "EXCLUSIVE REPORT" BASED ON EXTENSIVE INTERVIEWS WITH SAMUEL A. ADAMS, A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXPERT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA INSURGENTS WHO HAS RESIGNED. (END PRECEDE)

BY PATRICK J. SLOYAN

(NAME OF PAPER) WASHINGTON BUREAU

WASHINGTON, MAY 24--DESPITE THREATS HE WOULD BE FIRED, A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXPERT ON INDOCHINA WARNED PRESIDENT NIXON IN 1970 THAT U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS BEING UNDERCUT BY COMMUNIST AGENTS WHO HAD "PENETRATED" ALL LEVELS OF THE THIEU GOVERNMENT, THE CIA EXPERT SAYS.

SAMUEL A. ADAMS, WHOSE RESIGNATION AT THE SPY AGENCY IS EFFECTIVE JUNE 1, SAID IN AN INTERVIEW THAT HE IGNORED "INTIMIDATION" FROM HIS CIA SUPERIORS TO SLIP TO THE WHITE HOUSE HIS REPORT ON INFILTRATION OF THIEU GOVERNMENT POSTS.

"THE PRESIDENT WAS VERY UPSET AND SO WAS HENRY KISSINGER," ADAMS SAID. "IT SHOWED THAT VIETNAMIZATION--TURNING THE WAR OVER TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE--COULD NOT WORK BECAUSE THERE WERE AS MANY AS 30,000 AGENTS IN ALL LEVELS OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT."

ACCORDING TO ADAMS, THESE AGENTS OF NORTH VIETNAM ARE STILL HOLDING KEY POSITIONS AND "EATING AWAY THE GUTS OF THE THIEU GOVERNMENT."

HE SAID SOME OF THE COMMUNIST AGENT ACTIVITIES INCLUDED:

--A SENIOR ARMY GENERAL IN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE HIGHLANDS WHOSE ORDERS TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE REGIMENTS RESULTED IN SERIOUS SAIGON GOVERNMENT BATTLEFIELD LOSSES.

--ONE AGENT, EVENTUALLY ARRESTED, WAS ACTING AS CHIEF ADVISER ON AMERICAN AFFAIRS TO PRESIDENT THIEU.

(MORE)

TX23 SHEET TWO SLOYAN-CIA-EXCLUSIVE REPORT-ADV FOR THUR MAY 24  
X X X THIEU.

--ANOTHER COMMUNIST AGENT DIRECTED THE ASSASSINATION OF SUPPORTERS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WHILE OSTENSIBLY PURGING THE THIEU GOVERNMENT OF COMMUNIST AGENTS.

"MOST ALLIED INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS WERE PENETRATED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE AGENTS," ADAMS SAID. "I THINK THESE AGENTS RAN MANY OF OUR OPERATIONS AIMED AT RECRUITING VIET CONG LEADERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM."

FOR EXAMPLE, ADAMS EXPLAINED, THE CIA WAS FORCED TO GO THROUGH MIDDLEMEN IN EFFORTS TO CONTACT OR BRIBE VIET CONG OFFICIALS.

"USUALLY, IT TURNED OUT THAT THE MIDDLEMEN WERE COMMUNIST AGENTS," HE SAID.

ACCORDING TO ADAMS, EARLY IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT THERE WERE SOME SUSPICIONS THAT COMMUNIST CHINESE FORCES WERE INVOLVED IN VIETNAM MILITARY OPERATIONS.

"OFTEN IN SUCH CASES, WE WOULD TURN TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT FOR SUCH INTELLIGENCE," ADAMS SAID. "BUT THEY COULDN'T GET ANYTHING. INSTEAD, THEY WOULD MAKE UP--JUST MAKE IT UP--REPORTS ON WHATEVER WE WERE INTERESTED IN.

"WE COME UP WITH THE MONEY AND THEY CAME UP WITH COMMUNIST CHINESE ARMY UNITS, TANK UNITS ALL OVER THE PLACE. THESE OPERATIONS FINALLY BECAME KNOWN AS 'PAPERMILLS'--THEY'D TURN OUT ANYTHING WE WANTED.

"WE CREATED A COTTAGE INDUSTRY OF PHONY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY."

ADAMS' REPORT ON AGENT INFILTRATION OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT WAS ORDERED SENT TO THE WHITE HOUSE AFTER MEMBERS OF KISSINGER'S NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE WERE TIPPED BY ADAMS AS TO ITS CONTENTS.

(MORE)

TX24 SHEET THREE SLOYAN-CIA-EXCLUSIVE REPORT-ADV FOR THUR MAY 24  
X X X CONTENTS.

"THAT BLEW THE ROOF OFF THE CIA," HE SAID. AN AIDE WHO HELPED ADAMS PREPARE THE REPORT WAS TRANSFERRED, INTIMIDATED AND EVENTUALLY RESIGNED FROM THE CIA..

"THEY TRIED TO GET ME A LETTER OF REPRIMAND BUT THEY COULD HARDLY DO THAT BECAUSE IT WAS AN ISSUE OF INFORMING THE PRESIDENT," ADAMS SAID.

ADAMS' EFFORTS TO TELL THE WHITE HOUSE ABOUT AGENT INFILTRATION AND DOCTORED REPORTS THAT UNDERESTIMATED COMMUNIST FORCES IN INDOCHINA RESULTED IN A SERIES OF WHAT HE CONSIDERED THREATS FROM HIS SUPERIORS.

"MY REPORTS MADE THEM LOOK BAD BECAUSE I WOULD NOT GO ALONG WITH PRESSURE FROM POLITICIANS AND THE PENTAGON," ADAMS SAID.

"THEY (HIS CIA SUPERIORS) TOLD ME I'D BE OUT IN THE STREET, I'D NEVER HAVE ANY FUTURE AT THE AGENCY AND MADE OTHER THREATS," HE SAID.

AT ONE POINT, ADAMS DEMANDED A FORMAL AGENCY INVESTIGATION INTO CHARGES THAT THE CIA APPROVED ESTIMATES OF THE VIET CONG THAT HAD BEEN FABRICATED BY GEN. WILLIAM WESTMORELAND, U.S. COMMANDER IN VIETNAM.

ADAMS SAID CIA DIRECTOR RICHARD HELMS FINALLY CALLED HIM FOR A MEETING.

"WHAT DO YOU WANT ME TO DO--TAKE ON THE ENTIRE MILITARY?" HELMS SAID, ACCORDING TO ADAMS.

ACCORDING TO ADAMS, HELMS AGREED--BUT LATER TRIED TO BLOCK--ADAMS' EFFORTS TO INFORM PRESIDENT NIXON'S INTELLIGENCE STAFF ABOUT THE PHONY PENTAGON ESTIMATES.

BAD INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES RESULTED IN NIXON DEMANDING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CIA AT ONE POINT, ADAMS SAID.

(MORE)



TX25 SHEET FOUR SLOYAN-CIA-EXCLUSIVE REPORT-ADV FOR THUR MAY 24  
X X X ADAMS SAID.

AT ISSUE WAS CIA ESTIMATES OF SUPPLIES REACHING COMMUNIST FORCES  
IN SOUTH VIETNAM. INVOLVED WERE SUPPLIES COMING DOWN THE HO CHI  
MINH TRAIL AND THROUGH CAMBODIA'S PORT AT SIHANOUKVILLE.

"THE CIA SAID NOTHING IMPORTANT WAS COMING THROUGH SIHANOUKVILLE  
BUT THE PENTAGON SAID IT WAS AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF SUPPLIES,"  
ADAMS EXPLAINED.

ADAMS BECAME INVOLVED WHEN HE ATTACKED CIA ESTIMATES OF WHAT  
COMMUNIST FORCES NEEDED TO OPERATE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. "ACCORDING  
TO OUR ESTIMATES, COMMUNIST TROOPS WERE NOT USING AS MUCH SUPPLIES  
AS DID THE TINY REBEL ARMY IN BIAFRA," HE SAID.

"WE HAD GOOD INFORMATION ON THE BIAFRAN OPERATIONS AND  
WHEN I MADE THE COMPARISON, IT KNOCKED THE BOTTOM OUT OF OFFICIAL  
CIA ESTIMATES. IT BECAME KNOWN AS THE 'BIAFRAN MEMO' AND I WAS  
THREATENED WITH DISMISSAL IF IT GOT CIRCULATED TO OTHER  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

"IT MAY NOT SOUND IMPORTANT BUT YOU'VE GOT TO REALIZE THAT  
SOME OF THESE TOP GUYS AT THE CIA BASED THEIR WHOLE CAREERS ON  
ESTIMATING ENEMY LOGISTICS."

IN THE 1970 INVASION OF CAMBODIA BY U.S. FORCES, LARGE AMOUNTS  
OF COMMUNIST SUPPLIES WERE FOUND STOCKPILED AFTER HAVING BEEN LANDED  
THROUGH SIHANOUKVILLE. "THE MILITARY WAS RIGHT AND THE AGENCY WAS  
WRONG IN THIS CASE," ADAMS RECALLED.

NIXON ORDERED AN INVESTIGATION. BUT ADAMS SAID HELMS APPOINTED  
AS DIRECTOR OF THE PROBE THE VERY MAN WHO HAD COME UP WITH THE BAD  
LOGISTICS ESTIMATE IN THE FIRST PLACE.

(MORE)

TX26 SHEET FIVE SLOYAN-CIA-EXCLUSIVE REPORT-ADV FOR THUR MAY 24  
X X X FIRSTPLACE.

"IT WAS LIKE APPOINTING LIZZIE BORDEN THE HEAD OF A COMMISSION ON  
AX MURDERS," ADAMS SAID.

THE INVESTIGATION NEVER PRODUCED RESULTS AND IT IS AN EXAMPLE OF  
THE KIND OF THING THAT ADAMS SAID FINALLY PERSUADED HIM TO QUIT  
THE CIA IN PROTEST.

"I MADE A DECISION AT ONE POINT IN ALL THESE BATTLES THAT I DIDN'T  
REALLY NEED A PROMOTION. I WAS MAKING \$19,000 AND THAT WAS ENOUGH  
INCOME. I DECIDED I WOULD BE THE ONE GUY WHO WOULD NOT GO ALONG,  
WOULD REPORT THESE WRONG THINGS THROUGH OFFICIAL CHANNELS UNTIL  
SOMETHING WOULD BE DONE.

"BUT THE CIA CAN'T BE REFORMED FROM WITHIN. WHEN A GUY MAKES A  
BIG MISTAKE AT THE AGENCY, USUALLY HE GETS KICKED UPSTAIRS. HIS BOSS  
HAS SOMETHING ON HIM AND CAN BE SURE THAT HE'LL NEVER MAKE ANY  
TROUBLE AND JUST GO ALONG.

"IT IS THE OLD BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEM--EVERYBODY SCRAMBLES TO COVER  
UP MISTAKES AND PROTECT THEMSELVES. BUT WHEN YOU START DOING THIS  
WITH INTELLIGENCE FOR THE PRESIDENT, IT'S REALLY BAD."

EVENUALLY, ADAMS' EFFORTS RESULTED IN ORDERS PROHIBITING HIM  
FROM CONTINUING RESEARCH ON INDOCHINA PROBLEMS. "THEY ORDERED ME  
TO STOP LECTURING CIA AGENTS ON THE VIET CONG WHICH I THOUGHT  
WAS JUST STUPID. IT ONLY HURT THE GUYS WHO WERE GOING TO VIETNAM  
WHO DIDN'T KNOW BEANS. THEY DIDN'T HAVE ANYONE TO REPLACE ME SO I  
TOOK LEAVE AND CONDUCTED THE LECTURES ON MY OWN TIME."

(MORE)

TX27 SHEET SIX SLOVAN-CIA-EXCLUSIVE REPORT-ADV FOR THUR MAY 24  
X X X OWN TIME."

IN PROSECUTING DANIEL ELLSBERG FOR RELEASING THE PENTAGON PAPERS,  
THE GOVERNMENT CALLED ARMY EXPERTS TO TESTIFY THAT ELLSBERG HAD  
MADE PUBLIC "CLASSIFIED" INFORMATION ABOUT COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN  
VIETNAM.

READING THE TESTIMONY, ADAMS CONCLUDED THAT THE INFORMATION WAS NOT  
ONLY UNCLASSIFIED BUT THAT IT WAS THE SAME DATA THAT THE PENTAGON  
HAD "FAKED" IN 1967. DESPITE CIA AND JUST DEPARTMENTS EFFORTS TO  
BLOCK HIM, ADAMS FINALLY TESTIFIED FOR THE ELLSBERG DEFENSE.

IT WAS ONE OF THE RARE INSTANCES WHEN A CIA EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN  
PERMITTED TO TESTIFY ABOUT AGENCY OPERATIONS IN PUBLIC SESSION.

A FEW WEEKS LATER HE DECIDED TO QUIT WHEN, HE SAID, THE CIA BEGAN  
DOCTORING FIGURES ON THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN CAMBODIA.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAY U.S. AIR OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA ARE  
DESIGNED TO HALT A NORTH VIETNAMESE-LED EFFORT TO SEIZE THE U.S.-  
BACKED GOVERNMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE INDOCHINA CEASE FIRE.

ACCORDING TO ADAMS, THE CAMBODIA INSURGENTS ARE A HOME-GROWN,  
REVOLUTIONARY FORCE CONDUCTING A CIVIL WAR. WHILE THEY GET SUPPLIES  
FROM NORTH VIETNAM, ADAMS SAID, THE COMMUNIST INSURGENTS DO NOT  
QUALIFY AS "OUTSIDE AGGRESSORS."

AND, ADAMS SAID THE CAMBODIAN COMMUNISTS ARE CLOSER TO 100,000  
STRONG AS OPPOSED TO THE 40,000 TO 50,000 ESTIMATED BY THE CIA.

"IT'S THE SAME OLD THING AGAIN--THEY ARE TAILORING THE  
INTELLIGENCE TO FIT U.S. POLICY," ADAMS SAID.

IN RECENT DAYS, ADAMS HAS BEEN BRIEFING SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN  
ABOUT THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA AND WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE INTERNAL  
OPERATIONS OF THE CIA.

HE IS GETTING A LOT OF CAPITOL HILL ATTENTION BECAUSE OF THE  
WATERGATE SCANDAL'S CONNECTION WITH THE CIA.

"I LOVED MY WORK AT THE CIA, I FOUND IT FASCINATING. I HOPE TO  
RETURN TO WORK AT THE CIA SOME DAY. BUT FIRST I'M GOING TO WRITE  
A BOOK--MAYBE TWO BOOKS.

"THE CIA NEEDS SOMEONE TO CLEAN IT UP. SOMEONE FROM OUTSIDE--  
MAYBE CONGRESS."

-END ADV FOR THURSDAY, MAY 24-

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